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The Simmering Conflict Over Kashmir
The
Blame Game Of The Subcontinent
Simon Roughneen
One
of the problems with the current India-Pakistan conflict is the
culture of blame, which inevitably surrounds such a precarious
situation. Although latent in all such scenarios, the cliché-ridden
and loaded nature of the terminology used serves only to cloud and
simplify the difficulties involved in a successful resolution of the
current crisis. Among the international community, a loaded term
itself, is a fairly widespread consensus that the onus is on
President Pervez Musharraf to curb the activities of Muslim
extremists, another loaded term, operating out of Pakistan. Of
course, if these groups, and their official benefactors in the
Pakistani military and intelligence elite, were to cease operations
tomorrow, then much of the tensions currently palpable would
subside. If only things were as simple as that.
On
one level, there is insufficient attention focused in western
government and media on the nature of Indian rule of Jammu and
Kashmir, two-thirds of the territory of Kashmir proper. The other
portion is divided off by the Line of Control, a hapless misnomer,
across which lies Pakistani –controlled Azad, or Free Kashmir,
another dubious term. Human Rights Watch cites the Indian military
as responsible for gross violations of human rights in Muslim
majority Jammu and Kashmir, throughout the period since 1989 when
direct rule was imposed on the state. With the reality of Indian
misrule clear to Kashmiris in Pakistan, the ability of pro-Kashmiri
militants to retain sway with official circles in Lahore is
bolstered.
The
ruling Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party has three decisive
motives for wanting to retain Jammu and Kashmir. Firstly, in an
almost periodic assent to the Gandhian legacy in Indian politics,
Jammu and Kashmir is valued precisely because it is a Muslim
majority state. As such, it attests to the secular and multiethnic
composition of India, something regarded as vital, at least
rhetorically, to all Indian political parties. The recent election
of the Muslim Avil J.P. Abdul Kalam to the ceremonial position of
President of India attests to this compulsion in Indian politics.
Noble as it may seem, in reality it allows the BJP and others, portray
their Hindu nationalism in a more benign light. Indian misrule
predates the rise of the BJP, and aspects of these motives would be
present in any party’s rule if Jammu and Kashmir. What is crucial
for the BJP is that retaining Jammu and Kashmir is a totemic aspect
of their rationale. As a nationalist party, they adhere to typical
doctrinaire ideas about historic rights, national territorial
integrity, India’s destiny etc. Concessions to local wishes over
the disputed territory are seen as concessions to Pakistan,
irrespective of the legacy of Gandhi.
The
second motive lies in economic modernisation and the effects of
globalisation on India. Given the rise in competitiveness of
India’s hi-tech and particularly software exports, such a PR
exercise in political correctness is seen as necessary in ensuring
that western lobbies do not focus their governments’ attention on
the political incorrectness of a nationalist mono-ethnic party
ruling a huge multiethnic federation. Token actions such as the
nomination of a Muslim President are seen as necessary to India’s
retention of a decent image among western investors and trade
partners. Sadly, for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, they are far
easier to implement and have far less effect than real reform
The Indian leadership merely demonstrates greater insight
into western political culture than their Pakistani counterparts.
They know how to play to the gallery of western conscientiousness
and understand the importance of spin and politically-correct but
essentially meaningless gestures. The election by the Indian
Congress of a Tamil-speaking Muslim as President makes far more
headlines and creates enough of a good impression to offset the BJP-sponsored
pogrom against Muslims in the state of Gujarat.
Thirdly,
11% of India’s vast population is Muslim, making it the second
largest Muslim country in the world. With 120 million Muslims spread
unevenly over its territory, the potential for civil unrest and
ethno-religious strife is clearly visible. That the repercussions of
this could spread to other minorities, particularly Sikh and Tamil
areas, makes the need for a strong hand over Kashmir particularly
pressing. As regards India’s Muslims, any concessions over Jammu
and Kashmir or with Pakistan would likely lead to anti-Muslim
violence by Hindu mobs, possibly orchestrated by elements of the
Indian military and Hindu rightists. Although the potential for
violence lies on both sides, clearly the Muslim population in
general would be extremely vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the
Kashmir issue. Again, for reasons to do with image and the demands
of global economics, as well as good governance, the BJP does not
want a repeat of the ethno-religious instability, which emerged in
India last winter.
To
focus on India, however, is to miss much of the complexities of the
blame game. US demands that Musharraff crack down, as the saying
goes, on Islamic extremists operating in Pakistan have been a
requirement of the War on Terror from the outset. Terrorist groups
proscribed by the State Dept. must be dealt with without exception,
and there is no doubt that Jaish-e-Muhammed (the murderers of
American journalist Daniel Pearl) and Lashkar-e-Taiba fit the bill
more than adequately. As the tensions over Kashmir increased, due to
the inability or lack of will to rein in these groups largely
responsible for provoking India, the international (or Indian and
US) demands on Pakistan have increased concomitantly. A reasonable
demand, given what is at stake along the Line of Control.
However,
the American line towards the Kashmir issue is best described as one
of wilful ignorance of the complexities involved in Pakistan’s
position. What’s more, this is compounded by the fact that the
apparent simplicity of the American position is in fact deliberate
and self-serving. Despite Pakistan’s co-operation in the war in
Afghanistan against their erstwhile allies and dependents the
Taliban, the Bush administration has continued to back Musharraf
into a corner over Kashmir, a territory it describes as
“disputed” but seems to lay the blame for the current crisis on
Pakistan.
Terrorists
are terrorists, the freedom fighter debate notwithstanding. Any
anti-terror operation requires consistency and even-handedness. This
means that if the USA wants Pakistan’s help in fighting terrorism,
it cannot ignore that state’s own sponsorship of a terror war by
proxy against India. And to be fair, this has been the course of
action followed by Bush. Unfortunately, simply demanding that
Pakistan eliminate the terrorist groups is a self-serving dismissal
of the realities of Pakistan’s co-operation in the War on Terror.
Musharraf has already given much of his hand away by going over the
heads of pro-Kashmir (and pro-Islamist) elements of the ISI and
military in aiding the USA in eliminating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
Afghanistan, long a crucial factor in Pakistan’s anti-Indian
machinations, has been turned over to a hostile Northern Alliance,
against whom the ISI helped the Taliban win the Afghan Civil war in
the 1990’s. Pakistan has always wanted a pliant ally, or even
satellite state in Afghanistan. This is not only to gain leverage
against the Indian behemoth, but to forge economic and trade links
with the post-Soviet Union central Asian states, and offset the
economic malaise of a state haplessly trying to compete with a much
higher Indian military budget. Since the feared backlash against
Musharraf’s role in the war in Afghanistan did not materialise, it
seems that the possibility of a backlash against towing the American
line on Kashmir has been prematurely discounted.
Obviously,
the actions of the ISI in particular have been dangerous and morally
reprehensible in Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, this is the
context within which the USA expects Musharraf to tow the line and
take on the extremists. Unfortunately, this means not only tackling
Lashkar-e-Taibi and Jaish-e-Muhammed, but confronting the very
elements that put him in power in the first place, something the
Pakistani President has ample reason to avoid. The dangers to the
current Pakistani government are real, despite the line expressed
that Musharraf has the west pushed into thinking that the threats
from Islamists and rogue military and intelligence elements are
greater than they are, allowing him to perpetuate undemocratic rule
and justify any slack attempt to counter Pakistan’s terrorist
organisations.
Sure,
the Musharraf regime is unelected and hardly a paragon of western
constitutionalism. Despite being allies of the US in the War On
Terror, something paid for by downsizing of the economic sanctions
imposed on Pakistan after the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan warrants
criticism for a plethora of reasons. Musharraf himself has a dubious
past, being centrally-involved in the 1999 incursions by
Pakistan-based Islamists across the Line of Control. The idea that
there is
little evidence to warrant Western fears that religious zealots
could overthrow the government in Pakistan misses the point about
how terrorism, intelligence and political factors operate in
Pakistan. Jihadis could not overthrow the government directly.
However, the complex interaction between Islamist, intelligence,
elements of the military and others suggests that any official line
that offends the wrong people in any of these areas of the Pakistani
political system could have a chain reaction effect that could prove
fatal to the Musharraf regime.
When Musharraf’s elected predecessor, Nawaz Sharif, was pushed by
Washingon into climbing down over Kashmir and terrorism in late
1999, he was portrayed as a lackey, in a prelude to the coup that
installed Musharraf. It would be foolish of Washington not to expect
something similar to recur should Musharraf “go soft” on
Kashmir, on top of co-operating in the war on Terror and seeing the
apparent removal of Afghanistan from Pakistan’s sphere of
influence. If he was to fall, logic dictates that his successor will
be well within the reach of the ISI and other Kashmiri militants in
the Pakistani political establishment. This would do little to
offset the potential for all-out war along the Line of Control
dividing Kashmir, irrespective of the recent US – mediated thaw.
The core structural reasons why Kashmir could prove the setting for
a war between two nuclear powers remain in place The current
rapprochement will prove transient should the blame game continue as
it is now, without effective acknowledgement by outsiders of the
problems facing both the flawed regimes involved.
The
author is with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, Ireland.
The views expressed are his own.
By
arrangement with South Asian Analysis Group, New Delhi
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