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R A W:
Kashmir & Beyond
Romeet Watt
This
article first appeared in the Mumbai-based English daily, Mid-day
as a two part series and gives useful insights on the working of the
low profile Indian Intelligence, RAW.
BACKGROUND
Research
And Analysis Wing which is commonly know by its acronym RAW, though
an external intelligence organ of the state is known to have
domestic operations primarily in states of the Union where the
separatists and secessionists movements are strong. Formed in 1968,
RAW has had marginal success in its operations. It has had its glory
during the liberation of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) from Pakistan
when it took tremendous initiatives in ensuring that the Sheikh
Mujibur Rehman’s Mukti
Bandi movement succeeded. “Indian
sources, including journalists, have put on record how much before
1971 RAW had established the network of a separatist movement
through ‘cells’ within East Pakistan and military training camps
in Indian territory adjoining East Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini were
all in place organizationally to take advantage of the political
trouble in 1971 and carry out acts of sabotage against communication
lines so that Indian forces simply marched in at the ‘right’
time. RAW agents provided valuable information as well as acting as
an advance guard for conducting unconventional guerrilla acts
against the Pakistani defense forces”, writes noted analyst Dr
Shreen M Mazari.
Its
failed policy in Sri Lanka has been one of the biggest set backs for
RAW. The very fact that ‘Voice of America’ in the early days of
LTTE’s struggle used to address them as ‘Indian Contra Rebels’
speaks volumes about the involvement of the Indian Intelligence and
as to who the mentors of Prabakaran were before he turned his back
on them. According
to Rohan Gunaratna, in his book Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka,
RAW waged a secret war in India beginning 1983 so that when the Sri
Lankan armed forces launched a major offensive against the Tamil
militancy in 1987, the Indian government had already ensured that
the Tamils were well supplied and were able to conduct terrorist
acts that brought the war closer to Colombo.
RAW
has had limited success in its operations in Nepal, Bhutan and even
in Maldives which it wanted to use as a base for anti-Sri Lanka
operations. “ The ethnic crisis in Bhutan led by people of
Nepalese origin is also said to have been aggravated by RAW - to try
and turn the political crisis to India’s advantage. In Nepal India
has consistently intervened in the politics of this Hindu kingdom by
promoting pro-India politicians. The economic dependence of this
land-locked state on India makes it very difficult for any Nepalese
government to assert its sovereignty”, writes a senior analyst in
her paper India’s unconventional war strategy.
PAKISTAN
AND RAW
Unlike
its Pakistani counterpart, RAW has very limited role to play in the
domestic politics and as such is not used for espionage activities
aimed at political opponent as has been the practice with our
neighbors. In comparison to ISI, RAW comparatively maintains a very
low profile and little is known about its structure expect for its
chief who directly reports to the Prime Minister.
It
has had moderate success in its operations on the Pakistani soil;
has been instrumental in supporting the separatists and
secessionists movements but has not been able to sustain the
movements long enough to cause irreparable damage as ISI has been
able to do in Kashmir. Pakistan has time and again accused RAW of
sponsoring sabotage in Punjab, where RAW is alleged to have
supported the Seraiki movement, providing financial support to
promote its activities in Pakistan and organizing an international
Seraiki conference in New Delhi in November-December 1993.
Says
a senior political analyst, “Before
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan altered the dynamics of the
whole Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship, RAW sought to nurture the
Pakhtunistan issue clandestinely even as the Indian government
sought to overtly cosy up to certain members of the political elite
in the NWFP. When RAW saw an opportunity in Balochistan in the form
of Baloch discontentment - especially in the face of ZA Bhutto’s
dismissal of the elected government of that province - it moved in
fast to play up the issue of Punjabi dominance. While the Baloch
insurgency may have had indigenous roots, it was nurtured and
sustained with external aid and assistance and RAW’s trademark was
clearly evident through the Afghan route.”
Though
the role of RAW with regard to Pakistan first came to light in the
late 60’s when the RAW is said to have trained separatists at
camps bordering the East Pakistan. Its main success in the heartland
of Pakistan was recorded in the early 80’s with the advent of the
USSR forces in Afghanistan. It is alleged that RAW in connivance
with the Afghani Intelligence and the dreaded KGB made irreparable
damage to the mujahadeen movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan with
its covert operations. Writes Ikram Sehgal, “The
ugly face of terror appeared fully in Pakistan with the advent of
the Afghan War in the early 80s as the Communist-led regime in Kabul
countered Pakistan’s support for the MUJAHIDEEN by a spate of
bombings in the major urban cities of Pakistan, particularly public
market places, transportation modes and its nodal points, a
coward’s way of inflicting the most damage on innocent
non-combatants. The Al-Zulfikar movement was initially funded and
trained by Khan, the Afghan security agency, followed almost
simultaneously by India’s Research and Analytical Wing or as it is
better known by its Acronym RAW, in turn these were trained and
coordinated by the KGB, primary raison d’etre being to export
bloody terrorism to the perceived enemies of their respective
governments. During the 80s the KGB, ably supported by KHAD and RAW,
were carrying out a relentless terrorist campaign against Pakistan
through many splinter militant groups of political parties inimical
to the Zia Regime, Al-Zulfikar being in the forefront with primary
bases in Afghanistan and India and secondary bases in Syria and
Libya”
RAW
AND KASHMIR
The
former chief of RAW, A S Daulat presently with the Prime Ministers
Office is said to be the brain behind the RAW’s operations in
Kashmir. Apart from its regular activities which involves tracking
down the key figure heads of the militant wing of the separatists
movement, it has assumed a new dimension over a period of time: a
dimension that has been part and parcel of ISI in Pakistan.
Writes Dr. Bhaskar
Kasturi in his paper
‘Notes on the
Hijbul Mujahadeen and the Indian Intelligence’, “the
RAW chief handled Kashmir for a long time during his tenure in the
Intelligence Bureau. Everyone from the Prime Minister to J&K
Chief Minister Dr Farooq Abdullah listens to him. It is very rare
that someone questions this Kashmir veteran's observations. The only
time he was snubbed was when he accompanied Brijesh Mishra to
Srinagar to talk to Hurriyat leaders. Hurriyat chief Professor Abdul
Ghani Bhat had asked Daulat to leave the room.
There
is none better than Dr Abdullah to attest to Daulat's Kashmir
credentials. There are enough stories floating around about the role
Daulat played in Farooq becoming chief minister of the troubled
state four years ago. So there could be something in the argument
that the ceasefire was a RAW operation to penetrate and split the
Hizbul.
But
to what purpose? Only Farooq has been strengthened. This is so
because the Government, which six months ago released Hurriyat
leaders with much fanfare, now seems to have turned its back on the
Hurriyat leadership”.
Daulat
in his days as the chief of the RAW is known for his close proximity
to Abdulla. The stand that his successor Vikram Sood will take is
anybody’s guess for he has been carrying out the agenda laid down
by his predecessor.
ISI
has always had political dimensions to its operations and its role
in manipulating the political outcomes is an ascertained fact. RAW
has assumed the same role in Kashmir wherein Political Cells have
been formed involving the moderate separatists leaders, NRI
Kashmir’s (Including Pundits) and counter-insurgents with the sole
aim of influencing the political outcome of the Kashmir problem.
The
prominent counter-insurgent group which came into lime light for its
role in fighting the Pakistan sponsored separatists was Ikwan-Ul-
Musalmeen headed by Jamsheed Sheraji alias Kuka Parrey who currently
is also a sitting member of the state legislative assembly. His
role, which he played exceedingly well to the extent that he was
able to wrest control from the Pak sponsored separatists is areas in
south Kashmir with the backing of the Indian security forces.
But
as has been the precedent, New Delhi instead of taking this counter
insurgency against separatists to a logical conclusion decided that
the state would be safer in the hands of the prodigal son, Farooq
Abdulla. Had New Delhi followed up with the former policy, things
might just have been different?
Subsequent
to assuming of power, Abdulla ensured that the assistance rendered
to these counter insurgent groups was terminated and as a result of
which the Pak backed separatists and secessionist’s forces
systematically eliminated the figureheads of these organizations.
The
Hurriyat Conference which happens to the political face of the
separatists and secessionists movements backed by Pakistan has been
ridden with factionalism, which is alleged to have been engineered
by the Indian Intelligence. New Delhi’s policy towards Hurriyat
Conference has been that of ‘stick & carrot’, wherein to
begin with there was a complete crack down on its activities with
the arrest of all its front ranking leaders. The same were lodged in
various jails across the length and the breadth of the country. The
alienation of the separatist’s political figures was aimed at
marginalizing the separatist’s movement and at the same time to
facilitate that Abdulla was in lime light for he was feeling
marginalized with Hurriyat Conference being at the focus of
attention.
Given
the new dimension which emerged in the decade long insurgency in
Kashmir with the advent of foreign mercenaries, New Delhi changed
tracks and is said to have entered into a tacit understanding with
the moderate leaders of the Hurriyat conference which subsequently
facilitated their release from jails.
This
also formed and paved way for a process of ‘peace talks’ with
the political heads of the separatists. K C Pant’s appointment as
the chief negotiator on behalf of the Government of India was made
after this initial ground work was laid: RAW playing an instrumental
role in the whole process.
Thus
over the years, RAW focused primarily on the formation of
‘Political Cells’ within and outside Kashmir primarily aimed at
exploring possibilities for the revival of a mass political process
in Kashmir.
However
little was known to RAW then that the whole process will come
tumbling down as a pack of cards. It may have met with success in
Pakistan, given the nature of the state but failure was the order of
the day, for many of these separatists leaders turned out to be
double agents working for both sides. Thus contrary to the
expectations, they failed to deliver the goods.
Dr.
Bidanda M Chengappa, Senior Fellow, IDSA in his paper titled The ISI
role in Pakistan’s Politics has classified the nature of various
intelligence organizations. He says, “In a scheme for the
classification of intelligence agencies there are three models: (a)
bureau of domestic intelligence (b) political police (c) independent
security state. (a) The bureau would have specific powers derived
from a charter or statute and it is primarily concerned with
information-gathering about criminal prosecution of security
offences and it does not conduct aggressive countering operations
against citizens or political groups. (b) The political police are
different from the bureau because it enjoys greater autonomy from
the democratic policy-making and is adequately insulated from the
legislative and judicial scrutiny. It is close to the groups in
power wherein its powers and responsibilities flow from loosely
defined delegations of executive power. It could also gather
political intelligence and conduct aggressive countering operations
against political opposition. (c) The independent security state has
no external controls and differs from the political police because
its goals are determined by agency officials and could be dissimilar
to that of the political elite. Its operations are directed by the
agency officials rather than the elected officials.”
The
million-dollar question is whether our Intelligence agency is
carrying out its activities in Kashmir in the same manner as ISI
carries them out in entire Pakistan?
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