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Pakistan:
'Military-Mosque' nexus rejuvenated
Romeet
K WATT
SINCE
independence in 1947, Pakistan has oscillated between civilian and
military rule in an endless series of coup d'états, eliminations
and regime firings. Frail
political institutions and, its failing economy has added to its
multi-faceted crisis to make matters worse. The tribulations are
vastly internal, and the grave job of initiating remedial measures
will also require being internal. Pakistan's domestic problems are a
multifaceted coalesces of political, economic and social concerns,
and the fact that Pakistan has had in history thorny relationships
with two of its neighbors completes the grim picture. The well-being
of Pakistan's political institutions is also shattered by
limitations in its legal system. In
the post September 11 scenario, it is apparent that Pakistan’s
running of its foreign policy is irremovable from its domestic
policy. The intricate correlation between Islam, Pakistan, and its
people is core to the majority of these problems.
Pakistan has recently elected a set of representatives to the
parliament and the four provincial assemblies after
three years of military rule. This is the Sixth
general election in 17 years. The most shocking aspect in the whole
scheme of things is the strong emergence of religious alliance, opposed to the U.S. presence in
the region, in
a big way. Religious
parties had never won more than 10 seats or 5 percent of the total
votes in 56 years of Pakistan's existence. The results indicate significant opposition to Musharraf’s
strong support for the United States as well as his promise to
trample Islamic extremism.
M M A - which
stands for Joint Action Forum in Pakistan's state lingo, Urdu –
have made a clean sweep of the provincial legislature in the North
West Frontier Province, and
are likely to govern the southwestern Baluchistan province.
Created
after the collapse of the Taliban rule in adjoining Afghanistan, MMA
is opposed to Pakistan's contribution in the war on terror and
desires the United States to pull out its troops from Pakistan. It
also identifies with Taliban and censures Musharraf for apprehending
Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders and handing them over to American
establishment. The emergence of six religious parties under the
banner of MMA is seen in political circles as a big setback for pro-Musharraf,
PML (QA), also dubbed as “King’s Party” in the local media.
However
critiques of Musharraf assert
that he has used his alliance with radical Muslim clerics to provide
legitimacy to his dictatorship, facilitating the
formation of an influential and destructive “military-mosque”
nexus. Islam
in Pakistan is highly varied given various versions and modes of
faith. With a population of approximately 77% Sunni, and 20% Shia,
majority of the populace in Pakistani follow the “Hanafi fiqh”
or body of laws, and pursue one of two fundamental schools of
interpretation – the Deobandi, and the Barelvi.
A third group, the Wahhabi-influenced “Ahle Hadith,” does
not accept as true the interpretative customs of the Hanafi School.
Each
of these three interpretations of Islam has had its own political
face in the given dispensation to pursue a domestic and
international religio-political agenda of which the Jamaat-e-Islami
(JI) is the most prominent exemplar, and forms the nucleus of the
present religious alliance MMA. The other main radical parties are
Jamiat ul Ulema-I-Islam (JUI); a Deobandi organisation, and Jamaat
al Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP); a Barelvi organization. JI is also
closely associated with banned terrorist organizations, the Hizbul
Muzahadeen and Al Badr. Jamaat al-Dawa (formerly known as the
Dawatul Irshad), and its jihadi wing, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is
the most well known of the Ahle Hadith organizations and pursues an
international jihadi agenda recognizing no frontiers.
In
the post-election scenario, it is imperative that there be no false
illusions about a “progressive” democratic institution, pledged
by Musharraf, given the success of these Jihadi elements who have
grown in strength over a period of time when the popularity of
Musharraf has hit a new nadir, given his pro-US policies. The
domestic unrest in Pakistan is also largely attributed to these
fundamental organizations; Deobandi madrassahs are identified with
sectarian violence - Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Pakistan (LJP), being the terrorist outfits that
fight the three main Shia militant groups– the Sipah-e-Mohammad
Pakistan (SMP), the Tehrik-e-Jafria
Pakistan (TJP), and the Imamia Students Organization. They
are also involved in a series of attack on the institutions of
Barelvi faith. With the religious organizations assuming a dominant
role in the political spectrum in Pakistan, their agenda of
transforming Pakistan into a theocratic state gains momentum; with
unrest becoming the order of the day.
The
emergence of these organizations in a big way is largely attributed
to the policies followed by the subsequent rulers of Pakistan.
General Zia-ul Haq gave his dictatorial rule legitimacy through
Islam. When General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977, he chose
Deobandi mullahs for benefaction, and since then their potency has
amplified speedily. By administering an official Zakat (religious
tithe), whereby money was routinely subtracted from bank balances
and distributed to organizations associated with predominantly
Deobandi or Ahle Hadith beliefs.
The
critiques of Musharraf charge him of creating the “political
space” for the Islamic religious organizations that now throws up
severe defies to the Pakistani state and his leadership. The
General, many believe is slowly coming to an
“eyeball-to-eyeball” stance with the Jihadis in Pakistan.
However another school of though argues that General Musharraf has
been able to exploit the tendencies of altercation and polarization
active between the political parties in Pakistan for his own
expands. The
religious parties' astonishing show won't intimidate Musharraf's
grip on power, but it could provoke him to at least volte-face his
coalition with Washington's war on terror.
GENERAL
Musharraf has time and again promised a “deep rooted” and
“sustainable” democratic dispensation, something which doesn’t
seem forthcoming given the fact that the basis – a constitutional
framework – in itself is questionable. The constitution of August
1973 has expired in 1985, and what has been in force since then,
constitutional experts argue, is a “basic law” crafted without
the involvement of the people. Z A Bhutto has the distinction of
having constitution amended as many as seven times between its
promulgation and the date of his removal from office. During the
Zia-Junejo era, eighth amendment bill was passed in 1985 affecting
as many as 67 articles. The exercise was carried out to enforce on
the nation own particular and convenient variety of Islam.
Musharraf
in his third year of rule, in 2002, brought in his own revisions
suitable to his policies, by way of his Legal Framework Order,
gazetted in August affecting some 30 articles of constitution.
The supporters of the present military regime argue that this
for done to cross-
check
the “interruption” in the democratic process due to
institutional failure citing two reasons - centralization of power;
and secondly abdication of responsibility by the legislators.
However political observers point out that the changes will
undermine the parliamentary system. Analysts also believe that the
country’s authoritative military junta is instituting an
everlasting political role for itself to undermine the future role
of prime minister. The case that the future parliament will be able
to amend the new legislation does not have much hope. No measure
implemented by a military government has been disconcerted by
parliament except on two occasions.
Musharraf through these
amendments, has taken a leaf out of his predecessors (Iskander
Mirza, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Huq) books by arming himself with the
power to dissolve parliament and sack the prime minister should the
need arise. He has also checkmated his two detractors, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif by barring them to contest the elections. In this endeavor of his, the judiciary has played an
important role by upholding his legislations thus once again lending
it to serve the constricted benefit of the
military-intelligence enterprise; national interest assuming trivial
importance.
All
these developments have reduced Pakistan to, what the western
analysts describe, as a “diminished client” state depending on
diplomatic, economic, and military support on the US. The success of
Islamic forces along with a lack of basis for a true democratic
dispensation spells more trouble for the West. Despite pressure from
US, Pakistan has shown unwillingness or / and inability to tackle
their illegal political power, and the weakness of institutions and
education, making it an origin of insecurity creating instability in
south-east Asia.
Musharraf,
Chief of Army Staff, President and Chief Executive needs to address
his domestic constituency on priority instead of engaging himself in
anti-India rhetoric’s like “Kashmir runs in our blood.” It is
also imperative for Mushraff to understand that US and Pakistan lack
common historical and culturalities, and the common thread which
they share might ebb with the advent of pro-taliban forces at the
helm of affairs in two provinces bordering Afghanistan. In the
post-December 13 scenario, by threatening a nuclear escalation,
Islamabad pressed Washington to veto possible Indian military action
against Pakistan. But next time should he be unable to rein in his
own jihadi forces or engages his state in adventurism; it may spell
doom for his own stability as the head of Pakistan.
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