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Diplomatic
Tourism: Powell in South Asia... Again
K.P.S.
Gill
‘Dead
on arrival’ is how one observer described Colin Powell’s latest
visit (his third since 9/11) to New Delhi and Islamabad. His earlier
statements, downplaying the significance of this excursion, suggest
that Powell himself did not expect much more.
India
and Pakistan have become mandatory stopovers for roving Western
VIP’s offering non-solutions to non-problems in South Asia –
Powell, for instance, sees images of salvation in international
observers for the forthcoming elections in Jammu & Kashmir
(J&K). Meanwhile, the core problem in the region – the
persistence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, and of the armies and
infrastructure of the Islamist jihad in that country – is
systematically downplayed.
The
trend started after 9/11 (October 2001 saw Powell’s first tour
here), and intensified after December 13, 2001, when India’s
Parliament was attacked by Pakistan-backed terrorists groups,
leading –particularly after the brutal Kaluchak massacre of May
14, 2002 – to the largest military mobilisation this region has
seen. None – without exception – of these diplomatic delegations
have had anything concrete to offer beyond platitudes about ‘talks
about talks.’ And yet, to their home constituencies, they have
repeatedly reported ‘great breakthroughs’ in the Indo-Pak
imbroglio as a result of their sagacious interventions.
The
greatest of these supposed ‘breakthroughs’ came in the wake of
the artificial hysteria that was whipped up over an ostensibly
imminent war– and possible nuclear holocaust – in South Asia in
the latter part of May 2001, after the Kaluchak massacre tempted the
Indian leadership to engage in an experiment in brinkmanship. The
fact is, at no moment during that entire counterfeit crisis, was
there even the remotest possibility of war, and the ease with which
the tensions were abruptly dissipated by the Indian Prime
Minister’s sudden pronouncements about ‘clear skies’ bore out
the absurdity of Western projections. This did not, however, end war
speculation, and ‘experts’ continued to argue that the next time
there was a major terrorist strike in India, the country’s
leadership ‘would not be able to resist public pressure’ for
military retaliation against Pakistan – and Pakistan’s dictator,
President Pervez Musharraf, sought international guarantees against
Indian ‘overreaction’ in case of a major terrorist attack in
India by groups that he ‘cannotcontrol’. But another massacre of
comparable magnitude did occur – at Kasimpura on July 13 – and
there was not even a suggestion of a military response across the
Line of Control (LoC).
This
is crucial, because the pattern of Western – and particularly
American – ‘peacemaking’ initiatives has become a critical
input in the orchestration of tensions in South Asia, encouraging
the major players here to sustain tensions in order to attract
‘favorable’ interventions. The Western discourse has also set an
unacceptable limit on what needs to be done against terrorism, as
evidenced by the incessant harping on infiltration across the LoC
– Powell again saw fit to point out that it was ‘difficult’ to
accurately monitor the movement of terrorists from Pakistan into
J&K. The result is that, every time international (read, US)
pressure escalates, General Musharraf makes a televised ‘address
to the nation’ roundly condemning terrorism; for a few weeks,
infiltration rates drop; and the ‘international community’,
goaded by their ‘friend’ Musharraf, immediately begins to
pressure India to offer some ‘concessions’ to placate Pakistan
in return. There is something immensely offensive in this. As
offensive as the suggestion that, since Osama bin Laden has not
executed any further attacks on America after9/11, the US somehow
owes him something by way of reciprocal ‘concessions’. The logic
appears to be that if a mass murderer agrees –even temporarily –
to stop murdering our people, we owe him something byway of reward.
This is a position that should be rejected with utter contempt. But
it finds the most unlikely defenders in the ‘free world’.
This
is not the only distortion in the Western discourse on terrorism in
South Asia. The Americans continue to find it convenient to project
Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ in the war against terrorism,
and cite as evidence the fact that Pakistan has ‘co-operated’
with the US and has ‘handed over’ several Al Qaeda operatives,
including some at leadership levels in the shadowy Islamist
terrorist organisation. It is certain, however, that US Intelligence
and policy makers are entirely aware of the duplicity of these
claims. The truth is, at no point in the ‘war against terror’
has the Musharraf regime given a whit more than it has been forced
to concede. To take an example, the much-touted case of AbuZubaidah
– the senior-most bin Laden lieutenant to be arrested till date–
in late March. Abu Zubaidah, and more than 50 other Al Qaeda cadre,
were arrested at Faisalabad and handed over to US authorities only
after the FBI had intercepted their telephonic communications and
confronted local authorities, making it impossible for the latter to
refuse to take action. In another high profile case in December
2001, over 120 Al Qaeda fighters were arrested in the Kurram Agency
and subsequently given over to the Americans – but only when their
presence could no longer be concealed or denied as a result of a
quarrel between local tribal groups. There is ample intelligence
regarding numerous cases where Pakistani authorities have turned a
blind eye to the presence and activities of the Al Qaeda until US
authorities have coerced action, or till the terrorists have found
it possible to relocate to undisclosed destinations.
Much
of this is incomprehensible, particularly in view of the sheer
horror of what was done on 9/11, and of the enormous danger that the
surviving Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates constitute. It
appears, however, that domestic political compulsions and the
inertia of past policies are, once again, taking America down a
familiar path of supporting an unconscionable Third World
dictatorship – and a sponsor of terrorism to boot.
The
author is the President, Institute for Conflict Management
By
special arrangement with Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi. (South Asia Intelligence Review)
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