Soldiers
in pursuit of solutions
Najam
Sethi
General
Pervez Musharraf must wonder what the continuing fuss is all about.
His original constitutional amendment proposals were endless and
outraged everyone. But now that he has chucked away most of his
half-baked ideas, why is the public outcry still so shrill? In fact,
the international media is sounding downright hostile towards the
very “strongman” it so lavishly praised when he put
“democracy” on the back-burner in the face of the threat from
radical ‘Islamic’ terror. What’s gone wrong for him?
It’s
true that the constitutional amendments announced by General
Musharraf last week are absolutely ‘minimal’ in terms of his
original proposals. Essentially, his supporters argue, he has merely
restored Article 58-2B with minor alterations. So what’s the big
deal? Didn’t parliaments from 1985 to 1997 voluntarily accept this
clause? Didn’t all the political parties in turn beg former
presidents to use this clause and dismiss elected parliaments and
governments during periods of actual or contrived constitutional
deadlock? Didn’t well-meaning journalists write reams in defense
of the “checks and balances” enshrined in this amendment?
Didn’t the supreme court uphold all but one parliamentary
dismissal at the hands of such presidents? Didn’t the removal of
this clause by the passage of the 13th constitutional amendment in
1997 pave the way for the unmitigated sackings of the chief justice,
the president and the army chief, thereby emboldening the prime
minister to try and become an omnipotent and unaccountable
Amirul Momineen? And what is all this hue and cry over the
establishment of an “advisory” National Security Council?
Aren’t there twice as many elected civilians in it than nominated
soldiers to ensure sufficient civilian advocacy rights?
These
“reasonable” arguments tend to evaporate in the face of
weightier “ground realities”. First, General Musharraf’s much
trumpeted local government system has crashed before it could even
take off. Its “democratic” pretensions have been laid bare in
the face of central bureaucratic authority and its failure casts a
dark shadow on the rest of the “true democracy” still to come.
Second,
his reckless referendum to anoint himself president has dealt a
deadly blow to his personal credibility and revealed his true
political mindset. He is no different from Generals Zia ul Haq and
Ayub Khan in wanting to conjure necessary ‘results’. And it has
indicated his innate contempt for representative institutions like
parliament and consensus documents like the constitution. In fact,
if General Zia’s referendum was a farce, Musharraf’s will be
read as a tragedy. What little might have been acceptable from him
before the referendum is not acceptable after it.
Third,
his attempt to institutionalize the role of the army in politics in
an age of democracy seeks to reverse the natural order of things. It
will come a cropper, like General Zia’s did, when the
international community on which it is propped is finally done with
him. That is also why 58-2B might have been acceptable in the hands
of an elected civilian president as in the past but will constantly
be challenged as long as it remains in the hands of a soldier.
Fourth,
his attempt to rig, divide and rule flies in the face of society’s
urge for truth and reconciliation. General Zia kept just one party
— the PPP — out of the loop and failed to provide stability. How
can General Musharraf hope to keep the PPP, the PML(N) and the MMA
out of the reckoning and still stake a claim to longevity? He should
have co-opted the true representatives of the people — whoever and
whatever they were — in a political and statesmanlike manner
rather than manufacture consent and exclude them from full political
participation. In fact, as things stand, the next general elections
will probably go down as the most “pre-rigged” polls in
Pakistan’s history and rob General Musharraf of the credibility he
craves.
Fifth,
and this is the most important reason, General Musharraf’s act of
seizing the crown in 1999 is not half as illegitimate and
unacceptable as the Bonapartist act of putting it on his head last
week without seeking the approval of the next parliament. Neither of
his coup-making predecessors was so arrogant or self-righteous.
“Go to the supreme court”, he says contemptuously, “it has
allowed me to crown myself”, knowing fully well that the supreme
court does not have the power to “give” the power of
constitutional amendment to anyone. And what if the court were to
deny him this power? What if the next parliament were to try and
take it away from him? “Why then,” he warns, “I shall have to
sack it.”
All
these factors manifest an anti-institutional frame of mind that
mocks the very concept of checks and balances that he wishes to
institutionalize. It highlights the contradictions of the man and
his politics so eloquently captured by the remark that “the army
must be allowed in so that it is kept out”.
General
Pervez Musharraf has come a long way from the apolitical soldier who
was pushed into the cesspool in 1999 to the soiled politician who
has emerged from it in 2002. Sooner or later, however, the world
will recoil from soldiers and armies in pursuit of solutions and
focus on soldiers and armies as part of problems. And that is when
the cookie will begin to crumble.
Content
Courtesy:
The Friday Times, Pakistan
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