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Musharraf's
'strategic approach' to terror
Mohammad
Shehzad
What the global
community, particularly the US considers 'terrorism' is considered
'jihad' [struggle against injustice] by a powerful section of
Pakistani society - a clique of the jihadis, and the rightwing.
9/11 shocked the world reinforcing the fact that terrorism is the
biggest threat to global peace. It made General Musharraf change
Pakistan's decades-old Afghan policy within no time. It made him ban
some jihadi outfits including the high profiled Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT]
and Jaish-e-Mohammad [JeM] on January 12, 2002.
To assure the world of Pakistan's commitment, on every foreign visit
and from time to time at home, Musharraf renews his pledge to fight
terrorism. On July 1, 2004, chairing a high level meeting in
Islamabad, he said: "South Waziristan has become headquarters of al-Qaeda...
terrorists hiding there and their harbourers will be dismantled."
The jihadis and the rightwing, however, are sending different but
'clear' signals. They are in no mood to understand the gravity of
9/11, interpreting it as a Jewish conspiracy against Islam -
particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan - and propagate this idea
enthusiastically through the mosques' pulpits, public statements and
the print and electronic media. Thus, an influential Islamic scholar
Dr. Asar Ahmad wrote in the popular Urdu daily Nawa-i-Waqt [May 26,
2004]: "The US wants to make greater Israel by subjugating Iraq. The
9/11 investigations have been stopped because it was masterminded by
Israel and the US cannot take any action against the Jews. The 9/11
was not bin Laden's brainchild but of the US, Israel and the Jews.
It was masterminded to provide the US an excuse to destroy
Afghanistan. In fact, the US wants to make Afghanistan another home
for the Jews. It will facilitate Jews' settlement in Afghanistan."
While Musharraf corroborates that Pakistan has become al-Qaeda's
headquarters, the top jihad-monger, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed [LeT's
founder], challenges its existence outright! "The US has launched a
smearing campaign against jihad. It has coined a term 'al-Qaeda'.
Through the western media, it propagates false stories about al-Qaeda's
fictitious activities against the western interests and maligns the
Muslim world," Saeed writes in the monthly Voice of Islam [June
2004].
In an interesting contrast, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the hardliner
Muttehida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) leader, hails al-Qaeda for its
attempts on General Musharraf's life. In an interview with Weekly
Ghazwa [June 2], Qazi said: "General Musharraf is a traitor. He used
to be al-Qaeda' number one patron. But now he has cheated it at the
US behest. Therefore, al-Qaeda is right if it attacks him. It will
take him on sooner rather than later. The mayhem in Karachi is a
reaction to Musharraf's policies against al-Qaeda in South
Waziristan."
These and other proclamations lead to a dangerous conclusion: the
jihadis / rightwing have their own agenda, and this confronts
Musharraf's agenda - if he is committed to eliminating terrorism,
the jihadis are committed to eliminating him. Three attempts on his
life speak loudly of the jihadis' commitment, and the June 10 attack
on the Karachi Corps Commander underscores this reality.
Musharraf's biggest mistake was his poor judgment about the
consequences of 9/11. As renowned columnist Ayaz Amir puts it: "It
was the US stick that condemned Musharraf to change our Afghan
policy. It should have been our own decision. After the 9/11, there
was no room for our jihad policy in Kashmir. Musharraf thought by
taking a u-turn on the Afghan policy, he would save the Kashmir
policy. But Armitage's stick made us change that too."
Musharraf's early post 9/11 policies did not prove his sincerity
about fighting terrorism. He thought he would be able to run with
the hare and hunt with the hounds. His January 12 ban on LeT and JeM
was the most farcical, and failed to impress both the international
community and analysts at home. The ban itself was the outcome of a
mutual agreement between the jihadi outfits and the Musharraf
regime. The founders of LeT and JeM - Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar
respectively - had been informed in advance about the ban. LeT and
JeM simply registered themselves under new names - Jamaat-ud-Dawa [JD]
and Khuddam-ul-Islam, respectively - occupying the same
infrastructure. The office-bearers of the two outfits kept the same
portfolios. Both the groups continued to crank out the same jihadi
publications that glorified jihad and spit venom against India and
the Hindus.
Unsurprisingly, jihad continued to spread like poison ivy, despite
the Musharraf ban. My report [The Friday Times: July 31, 2003]
showed that between January-June 2003, the jihad-mongers recruited
more than 7,000 young boys, aged between 18 and 25, from various
places in Pakistan. LeT and JeM recruited more than 3,350 and 2,235
boys respectively.
On April 2, 2003, Hafiz Saeed addressed a huge rally in Islamabad
and openly solicited funds for jihad, displaying banners that
invited youth to join the LeT for jihad training. Those days,
Islamabad had imposed a ban on public assemblies, but Saeed was
permitted to hold the rally.
In October 2002, Musharraf made another mistake that has now become
a 'headache' for him. To oust the two mainstream political parties -
Pakistan Muslim League [PML] of Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan Peoples
Party [PPP] of Benazir Bhutto - he permitted the 'godfathers' of the
Taliban to contest the elections under the banner of the MMA - an
alliance of six pro-Taliban religious parties. Musharraf also
accredited the madrassa (seminary) degrees as equivalent to the BA
degree, the minimum qualification he had set for candidates to
contest the General Elections. Even as mainstream political leaders
were kept away from the election, illiterate clerics were
facilitated in their entry to Parliament.
The MMA is now dead set against Musharraf's agenda of the 'war
against terror' and labels him and some of his key cabinet members
as 'US agents'. These include Shaukat Aziz [the future Prime
Minister] and Zobaida Jalal [the Education Minister who is working
on curriculum reform]. Of late, Musharraf has started labeling the
MMA leaders as 'extremists', 'illiterate', and 'fanatics'.
Three attempts on his life, including two suicide attacks; the
attack on Karachi Corps Commander convoy; the killing of 75 soldiers
in the South Wazirstan by a handful of al-Qaeda terrorists; MMA's
mounting opposition to the on-going military operation in South
Waziristan and the deteriorating law and order situation in the
country, seem to have transformed Musharraf's strategy to fight
terrorism.
Earlier, analysts had remained skeptical of his resolve to fight
terrorism. This perception seems to be diluting now. Ayaz Amir
notes, "Two attempts on his life have made him serious about his
resolve to fight jihadis. Now the jihadis and the state are not at
the same wavelength. The direction of the state has changed.
Pakistan cannot wage a war against jihadis. Army has nurtured them
for the last 20 years. A 'Hafiz-ul-Asad' type crackdown is not going
to work, neither is it needed...'
Taking a leaf out of the British empires' book, Musharraf has
resorted to the 'divide-and-rule' stratagem to weaken the jihadis.
Knowing that Hafiz Saeed had become strong enough to defy him,
Musharraf has successfully orchestrated a split in the JD, just as
he had earlier done with PML and PPP. The larger-than-life Saeed has
now been made a midget. Dr. Zafar Iqbal - the co-founder of LeT -
will be the new chief of the JD faction that is now called
Khair-un-Naas (KN), which means 'public welfare'. The calculation is
that his moderate views would help promote Musharraf's agenda.
After the jihadis, the MMA is the biggest hindrance to Musharraf's
agenda. The MMA wants Musharraf to stop military operations in South
Waziristan; shed his uniform by the year end; drop curriculum
reforms and changes in hudood and blasphemy laws, etc. In other
words, it is asking Musharraf to push the country back into the
pre-9/11 period. It is now an open secret that Musharraf has made up
his mind to deal with the MMA in a decisive manner.
In the coming days, the MMA Governments will be dissolved, and that
is why the MMA has once again revived shariat issue in the NWFP. It
has barred Government officials from attending dance/music parties.
It has vowed to force people to prayers with the stick - a system
very common in Saudia Arabia. MMA plans to link the imminent
dissolution of its Government to Islam and shariat in order to win
the people's sympathies and malign Musharraf as a 'US stooge'.
If Musharraf is successful in dealing with the MMA, it will be
easier for him to continue as both the President and Army Chief for
an indefinite period. "There will be no reaction within the Army if
he does not shed his uniform. Was there any reaction when Hosni
Mubarik continued in his office for 20 years? Was there any reaction
when Suharto refused to step down?" argues Ayaz Amir. "...But this
is not the solution. Army is part of the problem in Pakistan. The
solution lies in doing three things: one, you have to make the
society more democratic; two, you have to stop becoming the
satellite of the US; three, you have to stop supporting the mullahs.
By becoming the US satellite, the country is just strengthening the
jihadis and the rightwing that thrives on its anti-US philosophy.
The country is thus neither going to democracy nor is getting rid of
the US."
Pakistan will have to wait and see whether Musharraf's new strategy
delivers or boomerangs. But one thing is certain - Pakistan's
history proves that it has always been pushed into crisis whenever a
military dictator ruled it. General Ayub's martial law resulted in
the disintegration of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh;
General Zia's martial law radicalized the moderate Pakistani society
and promoted the jihadi culture. It remains to be seen what legacy
General Musharraf leaves behind. But the words of an American
diplomat are significant in this context: "If Musharraf could really
cleanse Pakistan of the jihadi culture, he could go into the annals
of Pakistan history as a leader greater than Jinnah!"
Mohammad Shehzad
is an Islamabad-based freelance journalist and writer. In
arrangement with Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. |
