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diaries, interspersed with Islamist slogans attributed to the Afghan
warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, show the presence of a crude
counter-intelligence apparatus. It records the execution of 10
'spies' whose throats were slit after they allegedly 'betrayed' jihadis
to Indian forces between May 1999 and July 2002. The list
includes two women and three children. Such killings of Muslim
villagers, mainly from the Gujjar community, are common in Rajouri
and Poonch, and have continued through the Sarp Vinash
period. Five villagers were shot dead at Keri Khwas, near Rajouri,
on March 25, and another six were slaughtered at Kot Dhara, near
Darhal. Many of the killings can be traced to wholly non-military
origins, pegged around land and resource conflict between Gujjars,
Rajput Muslims, and ethnic-Kashmiri migrants.
An elaborate communications structure built around portable
satellite phones allowed terrorists to communicate on their handlers
with Sialkot, Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Islamabad, Abbotabad, as well as
sympathisers across India - calls were made to Uttar Pradesh,
Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. One photograph recovered from a
killed terrorist showed him posing in front of the Parliament House
in New Delhi. Since the satellite phone systems used by the
terrorists are of a type which uses a gateway in Pune to transmit
signals, it is possible Indian intelligence knew of the signals
traffic for some length of time, and was content to allow it to be
generated. Elaborate codebooks for radio-frequency communications
were also found.
There are lessons to be learned from the fighting on the Pir Panjal.
First up, it is necessary to remember that, the Army's own public
relations enthusiasm notwithstanding, this is not the first time
large-scale operations have been carried out in the region. In July
2001, twenty-one Jaish-e-Mohammad cadre were eliminated in a
bunker-busting operation above Surankote. Many, as investigation
later disclosed, were teenagers, tragically press-ganged into the
service of jihad. Again, in mid-2002, joint operations by the
Jammu and Kashmir Police and Rashtriya Rifles claimed eighteen
terrorists in Doda's Wadwan area, in some of the most remote and
difficult terrain in all of Jammu and Kashmir. Regular encounters
have taken place even in Hill Kaka, where the Army has found such
success.
The problem has been that offensives in the high mountains have
rarely been well thought through or sustained. Helicopter-borne
operations were attempted in Wadwan during the winter of 2000, but
the lack of an infantry presence meant that all troops eventually
found was one empty Kalashnikov magazine. In 1999, the entire 8
Mountain Division was pumped into Kupwara's Rajwar forests. Again,
lacking intelligence support and planning, the grandiose operation,
code-named Operation Kaziranga, succeeded in finding just one dead
body in its first two weeks. In the summer of 2000, company-strength
pickets were put up in Wadwan, and on the Margan pass into Kishtwar.
The mainly defensive positions killed no terrorists, and were burned
down when troops withdrew at the onset of winter - sending a clear
message to local residents about who was boss.
It is silly to blame small Army units in the mountains for failing
to operate aggressively, as the media often does. Consider, for
example, the case of Kishtwar. The district of Doda sprawls across
11,678 square kilometres, only a few hundred square kilometres less
than the entire Kashmir valley. Over 60 per cent of this area is
made up of the single tehsil of Kishtwar, which, in turn,
divides equally into four major valley systems. The northern valley
systems of Wadwan and Marwah were protected by just one battalion,
and a single company traditionally sent to Wadwan in the summer was
pulled out in 2001, enabling a massive escalation in terrorist
violence. The offensive operations carried out that year have had no
subsequent follow-up - and now, the Nagrota-based 16 Corps is
considering a series of Sarp Vinash-style operations in this
part of its domain.
Much of the credit for the success in Poonch goes to the new
commander of the Romeo Force, Major-General Hardev Lidder. Lidder,
sources disclose, was appalled to find that the Romeo Force, charged
with counter-terrorist operations in Rajouri and Poonch, just wasn't
spending enough time on the heights. Helicopter pads to supply
troops in the mountains, as well as minor roads, were constructed in
the winter to improve mobility. Then, without fanfare, troops of the
9 Para-Commando Regiment were tasked to take on a major bunker on
Peak 3689-metres in Hill Kaka, after helicopter surveillance flights
picked up large numbers of footprints through the snow leading to a
single complex. Thirteen terrorists were shot dead in the operation,
the largest single success recorded in the course of the ongoing
operations.
As terrorists groups scattered into the Pir Panjal, more troops were
called in to saturate the ground, and disrupt their movement routes.
The 6 Rashtriya Rifles was joined by the 163 Brigade and the 100
Brigade, pulled off duties on a new second counter-infiltration ring
along the Line of Control. The major offensive axis, as the
operation evolved, were Thanamandi on the Rajouri-Poonch border,
where a welter of killings of civilians had recently taken place,
Hari Buddha, Marhot, Hill Kaka, and the Bufliaz forests near
Surankote. Troops from the 15 Corps were also pulled in to block
routes from Saujian and Loran in northern Poonch, across the Pir
Panjal into Tangmarg and Shopian in the Kashmir Valley. It is
unclear just how successful these efforts, unlike the initial
strike, have been, but large scale terrorists groups have clearly
been dislocated and their logistics routes disrupted.
Lidder's most important contribution, perhaps, was to breach the
unstated ban the Army has placed on the use of air power in
counter-terrorist operations. Apart from the use of air-to-ground
missiles, Cheetah helicopters fitted with heavy machine guns were
used on several occasions. The use of such weapons was made possible
by restrictions on Gujjar herdsmen, which barred them from using
traditional high-altitude summer pastures, thus excluding the
possibility of civilian casualties. It seems probable that
terrorists will now seek to bring down helicopters, and it will be
interesting to see how Indian forces respond to such an escalatory
move. Operation Sarp Vinash also used technologies just
starting to disperse through the ranks of Indian infantry
formations, like portable ground radar and night-vision devices, to
considerable effect.
And the problems? For one, large-scale operations like Sarp
Vinash can't, very obviously, make up the bread-and-butter of
counter-terrorist work. There is no sign, yet, that its lessons
about the importance of rapid mobility and technology have
adequately dispersed through the Army. In fact, there is a very real
danger that operations that secure media coverage may now be
privileged over less flamboyant but equally necessary work. There is
also little sign that much-talked-about civilian-military synergies
are even being considered. Jammu and Kashmir, for example, has the
highest livestock-to-human ratio in India, but is also an importer
of milk and meat. A sensible programme of livestock improvement and
procurement might do more to keep Gujjars off the high pastures than
the arbitrary handouts now being given. Sadly, no one is even
talking about such reform.
Sarp Vinash has shown that innovation, intelligence and
enterprise do work. The problem is that this has been repeatedly
demonstrated over the past decade: only to be forgotten the morning
after.
By
arrangement with Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi
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