|
Pakistan:
Missile Overview
Special
Report
A
respected US defence think tank, NTI, reveals the bad and
ugly aspects of Pakistan's missile capacity and how far can it
depend on it against Indian nuclear capabilities.
Introduction
Pakistan
began pursuing a ballistic missile program in the early 1980s as
part of an effort to develop a deliverable nuclear strike capability
against India. Although Pakistan's initial efforts appear
experimental, the scale of Islamabad's current program clearly
reflects a strategic requirement to build a diversified and
survivable nuclear deterrent capable of targeting the bulk of the
Indian landmass. However unlike India, whose development of
missile-based power projection capabilities reflects both regional
and extra-regional security concerns, Pakistan's ballistic missile
effort is largely Indo-centric.
Islamabad's
present nuclear dyad consists of nuclear capable combat aircraft and
solid-motor and liquid-engine short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM).
The F-16 combat aircraft obtained from the United States during the
1980s were probably the earliest delivery systems in Pakistan's
nuclear inventory.[1] Combat aircraft
are operationally more reliable than ballistic missiles. In
comparison to Pakistan's current inventory of SRBMs, they also offer
other advantages such as greater payload and combat radius. However,
despite these existing advantages, land-based ballistic missiles are
emerging as the mainstay of Pakistan's nuclear strike force.
There
are three main reasons for the growing dominance of the missile leg
in the emerging Pakistani nuclear dyad. First, Pakistan has been
unable to augment its fleet of modern combat aircraft due to the
past US policy of military and economic sanctions designed to arrest
and slowdown Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Second, the
country's overall poor economic performance has prevented the
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) from undertaking major fleet expansion and
modernization efforts by making the switch from US to European and
Russian suppliers. During the late 1990s, especially after India and
Pakistan's May 1998 tests, US pressure combined with instability
concerns in Pakistan prevented external suppliers from selling
high-tech nuclear capable combat aircraft to Islamabad. Finally, the
unfolding and proposed advances in India's air combat, air-defense,
and long-range reconnaissance capabilities are channeling Pakistani
investments into a ballistic missile-based capability for which
India has no defense at present.
Since
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan has invested in both
solid-motor and liquid-engine ballistic missile programs with
Chinese and North Korean assistance, respectively. Pakistan's
reasons for investing in both solid- and liquid-propulsion
technologies remain unclear. However, analysts speculate the rival
programs could be the result of intra-institutional rivalry and
one-upmanship between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), which have historically feuded
over control and credits for Pakistan nuclear weapons-related
efforts. This rivalry may have also carried over to the development
of nuclear delivery systems. Furthermore, the diversification effort
could also be viewed as a proactive attempt on the part of
Pakistan's military to factor in possible bottlenecks or failure
along one technological front, as well as an attempt to diversify
suppliers in the face of US efforts to restrict the international
trade in weapons of mass destruction-capable ballistic and cruise
missile technologies.
Although
Pakistan's current fleet of missiles is restricted to SRBMs, the
National Defense Complex (NDC) and KRL are actively pursuing
programs to develop medium-range ballistic missiles. Most analysts
believe that the Pakistani military has achieved or is close to
achieving the capability to mount nuclear warheads on its current
ballistic missile fleet. However, some reports suggest that Pakistan
may be further along India on the path to achieving nuclear
operability.[2]
External
Dependencies
When
Pakistan launched a program to acquire ballistic missiles in the
early 1980s, it lacked the technological resources, industrial
infrastructure, and human capital to undertake the development of
such missiles indigenously. After a brief and unsuccessful attempt
in the 1980s to develop solid-fueled short-range ballistic missiles
most likely derived from sounding rocket technology obtained from
France, Pakistan turned to China and North Korea for assistance.
In
the early 1990s, the National Defense Complex (NDC), a subsidiary of
the PAEC, acquired complete though unassembled M-11s and possibly an
undisclosed number of M-9 SRBMs from China. Chinese assistance
extended to training Pakistani missile crews in the assembly,
maintenance, and simulated launches of the missiles. During the
mid-1990s, China apparently transferred an entire production line
for M-11s and possibly M-9s to the NDC. Chinese assistance most
likely encompassed equipment and technology transfers in the areas
of solid-fuel propellants, manufacture of airframes, re-entry
thermal protection materials, post-boost vehicles, guidance and
control, missile computers, integration of warheads, and the
manufacture of transporter-erector launchers (TELs) for the
missiles. Although China subsequently agreed to abide by Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines under US pressure, it
has interpreted those guidelines narrowly. Beijing has apparently
agreed not to supply Category-I or complete ground-to-ground
missiles, which would not cover air-launched cruise missiles. And it
does not abide by the MTCR's key technological annex. Indeed, the US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has alleged that Chinese
missile-related assistance to Pakistan increased in the wake of the
latter's May 1998 nuclear tests, and that such assistance is
critical for the success of Pakistan's medium-range, solid-fueled
ballistic missile program.
US
intelligence agencies are presently divided over whether Pakistan
can produce short-range, solid-fueled ballistic missiles
indigenously, or whether it remains dependent on support from
Chinese entities. Some analysts believe that the NDC's Fatehjung
missile plant, which was built with Chinese assistance in the
mid-1990s, is a "soup-to-nuts" facility that can turn out
replicas of the M-11s. However, other analysts believe that while
the NDC plant can produce most parts and sub-systems of the Chinese
SRBMs, Pakistan is still dependent on China for specialty materials,
guidance systems, and other critical missile components.[3]
Similarly,
Pakistan has relied extensively on North Korea for its liquid-engine
ballistic missile program. North Korea is alleged to have supplied
Pakistan with 12-25 operational Nodong ballistic missiles and their
TEL vehicles.[4] North Korean
assistance has also included technical support, including missile
launch and telemetry crews. Analysts speculate that North Korea may
have also transferred an entire production line of the Nodong
ballistic missiles to KRL. After allegations surfaced in US
newspapers that KRL had assisted North Korea with its
centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program in exchange for Nodong
missiles, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf stated that defense
cooperation between the two countries had ended.[5]
However, analysts believe that it will take Pakistan at least a
decade or more to master and produce liquid engines indigenously.
Until then, Pakistan will remain dependent on North Korea for
importing complete liquid engines, or at least their major component
parts, as well as the liquid propellants to fuel its missiles.[6]
Missile
Programs: Solid-Motor
Hatf-1,
-1A, and -2
Pakistan
embarked on an indigenous ballistic missile effort with the launch
of the Hatf program in the early or mid-1980s. The Space & Upper
Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), Pakistan's primary
civilian space agency, undertook the Hatf program. The existence of
the missiles was publicly disclosed by Pakistan's Chief of Army
Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg in February 1989.[7]
The
Hatf-1 is a single-stage, solid-motor missile capable of delivering
a 500kg payload over a maximum range of 60-80km.[8]
A subsequent version, the Hatf-1A, was tested in February 2000 and
is believed to have an extended range of 100km.[9]
The Hatf-2 is a two-stage, solid-motor missile that reportedly has a
throw-weight of 500kg over a maximum range of 290-300km. The Hatf-2
is sometimes also referred to as the "Shadoz" and "Abdali,"
nomenclatures that cause considerable confusion.[10]
The Hatf-2 is most likely a modified version of the Hatf-1 composed
of the second stage is the Hatf-1 with a new boost motor added to
the first stage.[11]
All
versions of the Hatf, -1, -IA, and -2, are capable of delivering
conventional high-explosive warheads. However, it is unclear if the
missiles have been modified for nuclear delivery. Some analysts
speculate that the Hatf-1, -IA, and -2 use an inertial guidance
system. But US government sources contend that the missiles are
essentially inaccurate battlefield rockets.[12]
The Hatf is road mobile; missiles have been observed being wheeled
on converted World War II-gun carriage trailers as well as modern
four-wheel TEL vehicles.
Some
analysts believe that the Hatf-1, -IA, and -2 are likely derivatives
of the French Dauphin and Dragon sounding rockets. SUPARCO obtained
the technology for building sounding rockets from the French company
Aerospatiale (formerly Sud Aviation) in the early or mid-1980s. The
French transfers most likely included technologies and equipment for
solid-fuel casting, curing, and solid-rocket testing facilities. [13]
Although
the Hatf-1 was declared operational in 1992 and the -IA and -2
versions operational by the mid-1990s, the missiles do not appear to
have been manufactured in large numbers.[14]
Neither do they appear to be in operational service with the
Pakistan Army. Flight-tests of the -1A and -2 versions in February
2000 and May 2002, respectively, suggest that a limited number of
systems may have been manufactured. However, the absence of
large-scale manufacturing or an extended flight-test program
indicates that the Hatf-1 , -1A, and -2 were interim contingency
programs, which were then superceded by the Ghaznavi, Shaheen, and
Ghauri ballistic missile programs, with Chinese and North Korean
assistance.
Hatf-III/Ghaznavi/M-11
The
Chinese DF-11/M-11 (NATO designation CSS-7), which goes by the dual
nomenclatures Hatf-III and Ghaznavi in Pakistan, is a
short-range, solid-propellant, road mobile, single-warhead ballistic
missile. China began development work on the M-11 in the mid-1980s;
the first flight-test of the missile is believed to have occurred in
1990, and it probably entered operational service in 1992.
Analysts
believe that the M-11 has a throw-weight of 800kg over a maximum
range of 280km. By trading payload weight for increased range, the
M-11 could deliver a 500kg payload over a range of 300km. Control
during the boost phase is probably exercised through "vanes in
the exhaust" or "small vernier motors with an inertial
platform for guidance." It is also believed that "the
warhead assembly separates during flight" and that "there
are four small fins mounted at the rear of the warhead
section." However, "it is not known if these four fins
move, or are simply stabilizers." Some reports suggest that the
missile has a terminal guidance system; the "separating warhead
section has a miniature propulsion system to correct the attitude
before re-entry, as well as adjusting the terminal trajectory."
[15]
Pakistan
apparently concluded an agreement with China to procure an
undisclosed number of M-11 ballistic missile systems in the late
1980s. Sometime during 1990-1991, US intelligence discovered the
presence of an M-11 training missile in Pakistan with an
accompanying TEL vehicle, which indicated that operational missile
systems were likely to follow.[16]
Beginning in 1992, US intelligence agencies tracked shipments of at
least 30 M-11 ballistic missiles from China through the Pakistani
port city of Karachi. Subsequently, China resorted to transferring
components and subsystems so that the missiles could be assembled in
Pakistan.[17] Chinese missile
technicians are also believed to have trained Pakistani Army
personnel in the assembly and simulated launch of the missiles,
which entered operational service in 1995 or 1996.[18]
Around the mid-1990s, China also built a turnkey missile facility
for the NDC at Fatehjung in Punjab. The Fatehjung missile facility
is believed to be capable of building either complete missiles or
most components and sub-systems of the M-11.
Open
source estimates of Pakistan's M-11 inventory range from
approximately 30-84 missiles. At least 30 of the missiles are
believed to be stored at the Pakistan Air Force base at Sargodha in
Central Punjab. Satellite imagery of the base has revealed the
existence of shelters for missile crates and their mobile launchers,
missile maintenance areas, and missile crew quarters.[19]
More missiles may be deployed at other currently undisclosed bases
in Pakistan. Although China developed the export versions of the
M-11 with high-explosive conventional warheads, the missiles in
Pakistan's inventory are believed to be nuclear-capable.[20]
Hatf-IV/Shaheen-I/M-9
Analysts
speculate that Pakistan likely acquired an undisclosed number of M-9
ballistic missiles from China in the mid-1990s, although open source
reports alleging M-9 transfers from China to Pakistan stretch back
to the early 1990s.[21] However,
some analysts now believe that China probably also transferred an
entire production line for M-9s to the Fatehjung missile facility
that it built for Pakistan in the mid-1990s.
China
started developing the M-9 in the mid-1980s. The first M-9
flight-test is reported to have occurred in June 1988, and the
missile probably entered service in 1990. However,
Pakistan first announced the test of an 800km-range ballistic
missile in July 1997.[22] This
missile was subsequently designated Hatf-IV or Shaheen-I and
was publicly displayed for the first time during the National Day
parade in March 1999. It was subsequently tested in April 1999,
October 2002, and October 2003, respectively. The photographs of the
missile displayed during the parade, and those of the tested
version, along with its disclosed range and payload closely match
the parameters of the Chinese M-9.
The
DF-15/M-9 (NATO designation CSS-6) is a single-stage,
solid-propellant, road mobile, short-range ballistic missile. It can
reportedly deliver a 500kg warhead over a range of 600km; other
reports suggest that with a smaller warhead, the missile could have
a range of 800km. Pakistani government statements suggest that the
missiles in Pakistan's possession have a maximum range of 700-800km,
but the missile's payload capacity at that range remains unclear.
Like the M-11 missiles, control during boost phase is exercised
through "exhaust vanes or small scale vernier motors." The
M-9 has a reported 300m circular error probability (CEP) and is
believed to employ some form of terminal guidance. Analysts suggest
that the missile has a "strapdown inertial guidance system with
an onboard digital computer,"....which "enables rapid
targeting and eliminates need for wind corrections prior to
launch." Unconfirmed reports suggest that the "separating
warhead section has a miniature propulsion system to correct the
attitude before re-entry, as well as adjusting the terminal
trajectory."[23]
Although
China originally designed the export versions of the M-9 with a
high-explosive conventional warhead, Pakistan is believed to have
modified its missiles to make them nuclear capable.[24]
The total number of M-9s in Pakistan's inventory remains unknown.
Hatf-VI/Shaheen-II/M-18?
The
NDC is reportedly also developing a 2,000-2,500km-range missile
dubbed as the Shaheen-II, about which little is known.[25]
Mock-ups of the missile displayed during the National Day
celebrations in March 2003 suggest that it is a two-stage,
solid-motor, road mobile system, transported on an 12-wheel TEL
vehicle. Analysts speculate that the Shaheen-II is possibly a
two-stage version of the M-9, or more likely a copy of the M-18,
which was publicly displayed at an exhibition in Beijing in either
1987 or 1988. The M-18 was originally advertised as a two-stage
system with a payload capacity of 400-500kg over a range of 1,000km.[26]
US intelligence sources suggest that Pakistan remains heavily
reliant on external assistance for the Shaheen-II program and that
China is actively assisting Pakistan through the supply of missile
components, specialty materials, dual-use items, and other
miscellaneous forms of technical assistance.[27]
Missile
Programs: Liquid Engine
Hatf-V/Ghauri-I/Nodong
Pakistan's
liquid-engine ballistic missile program is spearheaded by KRL in
collaboration with North Korea. Cooperation in the area of ballistic
missiles between the two countries stretches back to the early
1990s. The proposal to procure North Korean Nodong ballistic
missiles was probably on Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's
agenda during her visit to Pyongyang in December 1993. However,
Pakistani missile scientists and engineers are believed to have
inspected the Nodong as early as 1992 and were allegedly present
during the missile's flight-test from Musudan-ri in May 1993. The
Nodong deal was likely finalized during the visit of the former Vice
Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshal Ch'oe Gwang to
Islamabad in December 1995. Foreign intelligence agencies began
monitoring increased frequency of cargo flights between North Korea
and Pakistan in the fall of 1997. North Korean telemetry crews
reportedly traveled on some of these flights. Ultimately, Pakistan
flight-tested a Nodong, which was rechristened the "Ghauri,"
in April 1998.[28] North Korean
crews were present and apparently helped with the launch. Since
then, Pakistan has conducted flight-tests of the Ghauri-I/Nodong on
two other occasions: in April 1999 and May 2002.
The
Ghauri-I/Nodong is probably derived from a Soviet-era missile
system. Some analysts believe that it is most likely an upscaled
version of the Soviet R-17 missile, although there is insufficient
data to reach this conclusion definitively. The missile's basic
airframe is made from steel, although some sections may be crafted
out of aluminum. The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine
that uses a storable combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acid
and kerosene. During the boost phase, four jet vanes are used for
thrust vector control. It is also believed that the missile uses
three body-mounted gyros for attitude and lateral acceleration
control. In addition, "a pendulum integration gyro assembly
serves for speed control." The Nodong's range and throw weight
has been variously estimated between 800-1,500km and 700-1,300kg,
respectively.[29] The Nodong is
nuclear capable and can also deliver high-explosive conventional
warheads. However, it is unclear whether KRL has mastered the
capability to mount nuclear warheads on the missiles acquired from
North Korea.
US
intelligence agencies have identified an assembly and storage
facility for the Ghauri close to the KRL's Kahuta plant. Estimates
of Pakistan's Ghauri inventory remain unknown, although information
available in open sources suggests that Pakistan may have obtained
between 12-25 missile systems from North Korea. Speculation also
persists that North Korea may have transferred an entire production
line for Nodong ballistic missiles to Pakistan.
KRL
has also disclosed plans for longer-range versions of the Ghauri:
the Ghauri-II and possibly Ghauri-III. Some statements attributed to
Pakistani nuclear scientists and government leaders suggest that the
Ghauri-II will have a range of 1,700km; other statements suggest
that the Ghauri-III will have a strike-range of 2,000-3,500km.[30]
But details of the programs remain unknown and unlike the proposed
Shaheen-II, no mock ups have been displayed in public. However,
analysts cite the presence of Pakistani missile scientists and
engineers during North Korea's August 1998 Taepodong launch and
speculate that the Ghauri-II and -III may either be a Taepodong or
draw extensively on components and technologies from the latter
program.
Operational
Status
Confusion
surrounds the operational status of Pakistan's ballistic missiles.
At times, Pakistani government agencies and their spokespersons have
deliberately resorted to using a plethora of nomenclatures to
describe one or another missile program; at other times, they have
made unverifiable and contradictory statements concerning the range,
payload, and operational status of different missile systems.
Observers speculate that such attempts are probably a ruse to
confuse and prevent external intelligence agencies and independent
analysts from appraising the precise state of Pakistan's
missile-related efforts. Nevertheless, tactics that deliberately
promote ambiguity in an attempt to inflate capability should also be
viewed as means to enhance nuclear deterrence, especially at a time
when Pakistan's nuclear missile force is still in its developmental
phase. However, US intelligence agencies believe that the military's
control over the missile programs as well as the extent of Chinese
and North Korean assistance make it likely that Pakistan is further
along India in the path toward nuclear operability.
Even
though the Hatf-1, -1A, and -2 were declared operational in the
early 1990s, and the Pakistan Army tested the Hatf-1A in February
2000, both programs are likely to have been discontinued. The
Hatf-1, -1A, and -2 are short-range systems and most major Indian
urban and military targets lie beyond their range. Deployments close
to the Indian borders during a crisis or war, coupled with
improvements in real-time Indian reconnaissance capabilities, would
leave them vulnerable to early detection and destruction. Although
the Hatf missile series could conceivably serve as long-range
artillery rockets, most observers suspect that they lack an accurate
guidance system; others argue that the early Hatf missiles lacked a
guidance system altogether. Furthermore, most ballistic missiles are
not as cost-effective as combat aircraft in conventional battlefield
roles. Therefore, although the Pakistan Army may have acquired a
limited number of Hatf-1, -1A, and-2s in the early 1990s, and
occasionally tests them for reasons of public consumption, these
early missiles are unlikely to play any role in Pakistan's nuclear
deterrent. Similarly, Pakistan's acquisitions of complete M-11 and
possibly M-9 ballistic missiles, as well as a production line to
build them from China, indirectly attest to the failure of the
Hatf-2 program. Although Pakistan announced that it had tested the
Hatf-2 in May 2002, the missile is unlikely to serve as part of an
operational nuclear force.
However,
the Ghaznavi/M-11 and Shaheen-I/(most likely M-9) ballistic missiles
that Pakistan acquired from China in the mid-1990s are now believed
to be in operational service. Pakistani missile crews have been
observed conducting simulated launches. Other signs of operational
capability include observations of procedures for dispersal during
exercises and crises alerts, changes in alert status during crises,
missile tests to communicate political messages to India during
crises, as well as the construction of permanent launch sites along
the Indo-Pakistani border.[31]
Furthermore, China's alleged transfer of its fourth nuclear warhead
design to Pakistan in the 1980s and Pakistan's nuclear tests in May
1998 have led most observers to conclude that Pakistan has achieved
or is close to achieving the capability to mount nuclear warheads on
its SRBM force. The CIA recently asserted that it cannot rule out
continuing contacts between Chinese and Pakistani nuclear entities.[32]
However, some Indian observers maintain that despite Chinese
assistance, Pakistan's ballistic missile tests have not proceeded as
well as claimed in public; several technical and operational
glitches need ironing out.[33] But
such claims cannot be verified in the absence of independent
evidence. Similarly, although Pakistani leaders claim that the
nuclear-capable Ghauri-I/Nodong has entered operational service with
the Pakistan Army, the success or state of Pakistan's efforts to
mate nuclear warheads to this North Korean ballistic missile remain
unknown.
However,
like India, Pakistan does not keep its ballistic missile force on
operational alert. During peacetime, the missile force and nuclear
warheads are stored separately; the warheads themselves are believed
to be stored in a disassembled form for security reasons. Plans
exist to assemble nuclear warheads during a crisis or emergency, and
arm the missiles with warheads at a subsequent stage. Integrated
teams of military personnel and nuclear scientists/engineers
probably undertake such a task, ensuring organizational checks and
balances, as well as ensuring that no rogue commander or scientist
could act independently of the national command authority. However,
the precise make-up of such teams, as well as the operational
procedures for warhead assembly, dispersal, arming of the missile
force during a crisis, and delegation of authority for use during a
conflict, remain tightly held secrets.
Emerging
Trends
Although
Pakistan has a small force of nuclear-capable combat aircraft in its
nuclear force inventory, land-based ballistic missiles are likely to
become the mainstay of its nuclear strike force in the near future.
Apart from Pakistan's poor economic performance and its lack of
financial resources to modernize its air force in a significant way,
external suppliers such as the United States, Russia, and the
European Union are unlikely to supply Islamabad with long-range
bombers due to instability concerns in Pakistan. Furthermore, the
continuing modernization of the Indian Air Force through the
acquisition of high-performance combat aircraft as well as
substantive improvements in the latter's long-range reconnaissance
and air defense capabilities are likely to degrade the deterrence
value of the air leg of any Pakistani nuclear force in the future.
These factors are likely to encourage Pakistan's continued reliance
on a land-based ballistic missile-based nuclear force, for which
India has no defense at present.
Given
its limited technological and economic resource base, Pakistan
appears to have resorted to a strategy of importing complete
ballistic missile systems of different range categories and types,
standardizing and optimizing their production, and then attempting
to manufacture them indigenously through backwards vertical
integration with assistance from foreign entities. Analysts believe
that the NDC can now probably produce solid-fueled Ghaznavi (M-11)
and Shaheen-I (possibly M-9) ballistic missiles in small batches.
Over time, Pakistani missile scientists and engineers could improve
the performance characteristics of these missiles by making
modifications in the solid-propellant motors, achieving weight
reduction through the use of lighter materials, and increase their
accuracy through the use of either improved inertial navigation or
the use of global positioning systems.[34]
However,
Pakistan's current fleet of solid-fueled SRBMs suffers from range
limitations. In order to strike targets in western India, the
missiles need to be deployed close to the Indo-Pakistani border, a
condition that leaves them vulnerable to early detection and
destruction. More significantly, the SRBMs lack the range to strike
targets in eastern, central, and southern India. These shortcomings
are expected to be addressed by the medium-range Shaheen-II and
Ghauri-II programs, which are under development at the NDC and KRL,
respectively. Despite US pressure, China is likely to stick to its
commitment to help Pakistan in the development of the Shaheen-II
medium-range ballistic missile program. But unlike the past, when
China transferred compete missile systems and assembly and
production lines to Pakistan, the current pattern of Chinese
assistance is apparently restricted to design advice, specialty
materials, missile components, guidance systems, and related
dual-use machine tools and technologies.
It
is also unclear whether KRL has the ability to produce the Ghauri-I/Nodong
indigenously. Although North Korea is alleged to have transferred
12-20 operational missiles to Pakistan, it is uncertain whether
cooperation extended to the transfer of a production line for the
missiles as well. After KRL's alleged assistance to North Korea's
centrifuge enrichment efforts came to light, Pakistan insisted that
it had ended its defense cooperation program with North Korea.
Although continued secret contacts between entities in both
countries cannot be ruled out, Pyongyang might find itself less
inclined to continue with its program of missile cooperation in the
event of any future grand bargain with the United States that is
backed by economic and security guarantees from China, Japan, South
Korea, and Russia. Since the development of longer-range versions of
the Ghauri would probably require the development of a new
liquid-fueled engine entirely, or multi-staging involving liquid
engines and solid motors, termination of North Korean assistance
could result in a serious set back for Pakistan's Ghauri-II
ballistic missile development efforts.
Despite
public pronouncements by Pakistani scientists that the Shaheen-II
and Ghauri-II are ready for flight-tests, both systems have not been
tested so far. Independent analysts speculate that although Pakistan
might be able to flight-test both missiles in the near-term and
possibly produce a small number of prototypes for test-demonstration
purposes, Islamabad is unlikely to be able to build and deploy them
in large numbers. This is largely because Pakistan does not have a
large and vertically integrated research, development, and
manufacturing infrastructure to build long-range rockets.
Furthermore, there is poor coordination and integration between
government-controlled research and development labs, public sector
firms, and private sector companies. Although there is some evidence
of private sector participation in the production of the Shaheen-I
SRBM, on the whole, Pakistani private sector firms do not have much
experience in manufacturing high-technology products. In addition,
Pakistan does not as yet produce basic strategic materials, such as
aerospace-grade specialty steels, alloys, and composites, for which
it is entirely dependent on imports. This deficiency also extends to
missile guidance, control and navigation systems, and components
such as gyroscopes, missile computers, and accelerometers. Finally,
Pakistan lacks the requisite human capital—a large and dedicated
pool of aerospace scientists and engineers from which to draw on for
a large-scale ballistic or cruise missile program. Thus, Pakistan
will most likely remain dependent on external suppliers for its MRBM
program in the short- and medium-term.[35]
Although
Pakistani leaders have suggested that Islamabad might deploy
nuclear-capable missiles at sea in the future, the Pakistan Navy (PN)
does not appear to be pursuing either sea-launched cruise or
ballistic missile programs. Neither has the PN made the case for the
acquisition or development of nuclear submarines. At this point in
time, the PN's status as a junior service in comparison to the Army
and Air Force, together with resource constraints, both
technological and economic, constitutes the principal stumbling
blocks to any Pakistani sea-based nuclear capability. Furthermore,
it is also unclear whether China, which is in the midst of a gradual
course correction in its relations with India, and already under
considerable US pressure to terminate missile assistance to
Pakistan, would aid Islamabad in any proposed efforts to acquire a
sea-based nuclear missile capability.
However,
India's efforts to invest in theater ballistic missile defense
through the acquisition of either the Israeli Arrow-2 or the US
PAC-3 systems could spur significant changes in Pakistan's missile
programs. Although an Indian theater missile defense would not
create a leak-proof defense umbrella, a limited missile defense
coupled with improvements in Indian long-range air and
satellite-based reconnaissance capabilities could severely undercut
the deterrence value of a Pakistani SRBM force. This latter trend,
coupled with Chinese concerns over US attempts to provide Taiwan
with a theater missile defense capability, could lead to deepening
cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad. In the future, China
could conceivably help Pakistan develop intermediate-range ballistic
missile systems, land- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic
missiles, and missiles with fast burning boosters using high-energy
solid-propellants, multiple warheads, maneuverable re-entry
vehicles, decoys, and other means to fool ballistic missile
defenses.
Nonetheless,
it is highly unlikely that Pakistan would seek to develop an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability in the short-
and medium-term. The technological difficulties of developing such a
capability apart, Pakistan's security concerns are primarily
Indo-centric. Since medium- and intermediate-range missiles would
suffice to hold most targets in India hostage to the threat of a
nuclear strike, Pakistani leaders currently regard an ICBM
capability as a strategic irrelevance.
Key
Sources:
[1] "Pakistan," Deadly
Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 207, 213-214.
[2] "Pakistan's nukes outstrip
India's, officials say," MSNBC News, 6 June 2000, <http://www.msnbc.news>.
[3] R. Jeffrey Smith, 'China Linked
To Pakistani Missile Plant; Secret Project Could Renew Sanctions
issue," Washington Post, 25 August 1996, A Section, p.
A01; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>;
Tim Weiner, "U.S. Says It Suspects China Is Helping Pakistan
With Missiles," New York Times, 26 August 1996, p. 6; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>;
"Pakistan's Missiles," Pittsburg Post-Gazette (Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania), 27 August 1997, p. A-4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic
Universe, 26 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>;
Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Wary of Punishing China For Missile Help
To Pakistan," New York Times, 27 August 1997, p. 6; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>;
Douglas Waller, "The Secret Missile Deal," Time, 30
June 1997; <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/23/time/missiles.html>.
[4] Joseph S. Bermudez, "A
History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,"
Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
(Monterey: 1999), <http://cns/pubs/opapers/op2/index.htm>.
[5] "Pakistan denies aiding N.
Korea: Pyongyang's nuke plans," Dawn (Karachi), 7
November 2003, <http://www.dawn.com>.
[6] A. Baskaran, "An Assessment
of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper
Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security,
Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, p. 22.
[7] Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan
announces first successful test of its own missile," Independent
(London), 6 February 1989; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6
February 1989, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[8] "Hatf-1 – Pakistan Missile
Special Weapons Delivery Systems," Federation of American
Scientists, November 2003, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-1.htm>.
[9] Amit Baruah, "Pak. test
fires Hatf-I missile," Hindu (Chennai), 8 February 2000;
in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 February 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[10] "Hatf-2/Shadoz-Pakistan
Special Weapons Guide: Missiles," Global Security.Org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/hatf-2.htm>,
(November 2003); "Abdali (Hatf-2) BRBM, PakistaniDefence.com,
<http://www.pakistanidefence.com/images/AbdaliPictures.htm>,
(January 2004).
[11] S. Chandrashekar, "An
Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," Missile
Monitor, Number 3, Spring 1993, pp. 7-8.
[12] "Pakistan derives its
first "Hatf" missiles from foreign space rockets," The
Risk Report, Volume 1, Number 8, October 1995, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/hatf.html>.
[13] Chandrashekar, "An
Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," pp. 5-6.
[14] "Hatf Missiles
1/2/3," PakDirectory, November 2003, <http://www.pakdirectory.net/hatf_missiles.asp>.
[15] "CSS-7 (DF-11/M-11) –
People's Republic of China: Offensive Weapons," Duncan Lennox
ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 25, (Coulsdon:
September 1997).
[16] Bill Gertz, "Missile
Deception," Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration
Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery
Publishing, Inc., 1999), p. 159.
[17] R. Jeffrey Smith, "China
said to sell arms to Pakistan; M-11 Missile Shipment may break vow
to U.S.," Washington Post, 4 December 1992, p. A10; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;
Jim Mann, "China said to sell Pakistan dangerous new
missiles," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1992, p. 1; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[18] Document cited in, Gertz, Betrayal:
How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, p.
268.
[19] R. Jeffrey Smith and David B.
Ottaway, "Spy Photos suggest China Missile Trade; Pressure for
Sanctions builds over evidence that Pakistan has M-11s," Washington
Post, 3 July 1995, p. A01; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3
July 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[20] "Pakistan," Deadly
Arsenals, pp. 213-214.
[21] Bill Gertz, "China can't
say no to arms buyers," Washington Times, 28 May 1991,
p. A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 May 1991, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[22] "Government Confirms
Test-Firing of New Missile," Agence France Presse, 3 July 1997;
in FBIS Document FTS19970703000413, 3 July 1997.
[23] "CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9) –
People's Republic of China: Offensive Weapons," Duncan Lennox,
ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.
[24] "Pakistan," Deadly
Arsenals, p. 214.
[25] "Pakistan's
'Multi-Stage' 2,500km Range 'Shaheen-II' Missile Ready For
Testing," Dawn (Karachi), 17 September 2000; in FBIS
Document SAP20000917000011, 17 September 2000.
[26] "Shaheen-II/Hatf-6/Ghaznavi:
Pakistan Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems," Federation
of American Scientists, December 2003, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/shaheen-2.htm>.
[27] David E. Sanger and Eric
Schmitt, "Reports Say China is Aiding Pakistan on Missile
Project," New York Times, 2 July 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com>;
"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions," Central Intelligence Agency, 1
January-30 June 2001, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan-2002.htm>.
[28] For a historical overview of
missile cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan, see Gaurav
Kampani, "Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and
North Korea," Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2002,
Volume 9, Number 3, pp. 109-111.
[29] "Nodong: Overview and
Technical Assessment," NTI: North Korea Profile- Missile, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/1363.html>,
(updated January 2004).
[30] "Ghauri-III Engine Said
Successfully Tested," Ausaf (Islamabad), 24 June 1999;
in FBIS Document FTS19990624000013, 24 June 1999; "Pakistan
Reportedly Begins Preparations For Testing Ghauri-3 Missile,"
BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 April 2002; in Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe, 21 April 2002, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[31] Bruce Riedel, American
Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Center for
the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series 2002, <http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm>;
Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Builds Missile Sites Near Border With
India; Bush Asks Nations to Ease Tensions," Washington Tines,
p. A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 January 2002,
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[32] "Unclassified Report to
Congress On the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons," Central
Intelligence Agency, 1 January-30 June 2003, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#17>.
[33] "Chinks in Pak's Missile
Armoury," Financial Express (Mumbai), 31 May 2002; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 May 2002, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
[34] A. Baskaran, "An
Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia,"
pp. 16-26.
[35] Ibid. |
