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Jihadi
Terror: The Bangladesh connection!
Haroon
Habib
The
Bangladesh Government recently and sharply rejected a Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) report that had alleged that
Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia's Government was "not doing
enough" to prevent the country from becoming a "haven for
Islamic terrorists" in South Asia. The report, obtained by the
Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act, says the
Bangladesh Government was unwilling to crack down on Islamic
terrorism. The CSIS report also suggested that there could be
dangers to Canadian aid agencies in Bangladesh. A foreign office
spokesman at Dhaka has dubbed the report 'a campaign to malign
Bangladesh'.
Similar 'rejections' had also been articulated by the Bangladesh
Foreign Office, and by powerful ministers of the alliance
Government, when the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Time
magazine, and subsequently other prominent foreign media, published
reports about growing jehadi activities following the change
of regime in Dhaka after the elections of 2001. While the ruling
Alliance has consistently denied the presence of Islamic militants
in the country, the nation's vibrant Press, political Opposition and
leaders of civil society have repeatedly projected a different
picture.
While the Government's overall position remains broadly unchanged,
there is now growing evidence of a less aggressive stance, as
evidence mounts, with at least occasional disclosures of encounters
and arrests of jehadis by the enforcement agencies leaving
them no choice but to admit that a number of clandestine militant
Islamic groups were, in fact, active across the country, and were
receiving significant external support.
There are now increasing reports of the operation of several jehadi
groups in the country, particularly in its northern and western
regions, with coherent linkages and political networks, as well as
access to arms and military training. Whatever their actual numbers
or present capabilities, as well as the limited influence they have
on the general population, these jehadis have started causing
alarm in democratic circles, and unless they are effectively
contained, may become a real and extraordinary danger in the
imminent future. There are also frequent allegations in the media
regarding the 'mysteriously soft' attitude of the Government towards
these entities, as none of the arrested militants has, so far,
received any punishment, nor has there been any meaningful
investigation into their funding and support structures.
Police and intelligence agencies first suspected the involvement of
these underground outfits in a series of bomb blasts at secular
cultural functions and political meetings, which killed nearly a
hundred people between 1997 and 2001. The fanatics also planted
powerful bombs at one of then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's
political meetings. At that time, Government agencies had unearthed
some militant 'hideouts' and a few cadres with suspected 'foreign
connections' were arrested. But the administrative measures were too
small to contain the fast growing networks that have become
entrenched over the past decades.
Understandably, with the change of regime in mid-2001, the genuine
national concern was perhaps neglected since the new Government had
been formed with the support of two of the country's organized
fundamentalist parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islami Oikya
Jote (IOJ). The installation of the alliance Government gave a boost
to the radical Islamists's morale, after they had virtually been on
the run during the previous Awami League (AL) rule. With the change
of guard, most of the arrested militants, including those
charge-sheeted, were released on bail and eventually the charges
against them were dropped. Within a year, however, the 'concern' had
started resurfacing, with the media reporting frequent encounters
between 'armed Islamic militants' and the police, as well as
subsequent arrests, with interrogations throwing light on foreign
linkages of the cadres and organizations.
Although these clandestine armed outfits first came to be focused on
in the late Nineties, they have had their roots in the country since
1971, when Bengalis of the former East Pakistan were fighting their
war of liberation against then-West Pakistan. The Jamaat-e-Islami,
with its militant students' group, Islami Chhatra Sangha, had
floated their first armed cadres, 'Al-Badar' and ' Al -Shams' to
'defend Islam' and Pakistan's unity while the Pakistan Central
Government had formed the 'Razakar Bahini' to counter the Bengali
freedom fighters. Two senior ministers of the present cabinet -
Matiur Rahman Nizami and Ali Ahsan Mujahid - were directly involved
in the floating of these infamous groups, which were responsible for
killing of hundreds of secular Bengali intellectuals after branding
them 'anti-Islamic'. These groups were the first militant religious
organizations in this country, formed in close co-operation with the
Pakistani Army.
Following the bloody political changeover in 1975, Bangladesh has
passed through a prolonged military and pseudo-democratic era. The
banned Jamaat-e-Islami and other 'anti-liberation' entities which
took part in the 1971 genocide were once again given license to
operate, thanks to the subsequently assassinated President General
Zia-ur-Rahman, the founder of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
And in the name of Islamic charity and religious education, the jehadis
started building up their initial bases with substantial funding
reportedly from sources abroad. Over the years, thousands of madrassas
(seminaries), known as 'Koumi Madrassas', entirely outside
governmental control and nor accountable to anyone except their
sponsors, were built. The main objective of the sponsors of a large
proportion of these madrassas was allegedly to train and
develop the 'soldiers of Allah': the jehadis.
Testimonies of arrested militants suggest that they are well funded
and well equipped to carry out an 'Islamic revolution' in the
country. They are staunch admirers of the Taliban, and many of their
cadres reportedly fought in Afghanistan and also in Kashmir. Media
reports suggest that a section of the Jamaat-e-Islami, IOJ and the
Islami Shasantantra Andolon may be in league with some of these
extremist groups, though these political fronts have all denied the
charge. The Government has not banned any of the militant groups so
far, with the exception of Al-Hikma.
Ironically, while the Government seems adamant about rejecting the
'charges' regarding religious militancy in the country, its Social
Welfare Minister and Jamaat-e-Islami Secretary General, Ali Ahsan
Mujahid's remarks on December 19, 2003, deserve special scrutiny.
"The base of the fundamentalists in Bangladesh," he
declared at a party meeting in northern Nilphamari, "is so
strong that all other powers are sure to be defeated here." He
added further, "in a country where azans (calls to
prayer) are offered from lakhs of mosques every day, there is no
chance for the Awami League to return to power…."
Incidents in the early months of year 2003 suggested that, though
the militant outfits may not be very large, their cadres had been
completely indoctrinated by their mentors to launching campaigns of
violence that members of the groups claimed were a 'holy war'. There
are also reasons to believe that the activities of these extremist
groups have a regional and global dimension, although there has been
no serious investigation or probe into this aspect.
Bangladesh is an over-populated country with high levels of
illiteracy and unemployment, and has been targeted by vested
interests for a kind of political adventurism. Nevertheless, despite
being deeply religious, the common people of the country have no
special love for the jehadis, though a section of the
extremely poverty stricken may be vulnerable to their blandishments
if their activities and agenda are not effectively challenged. The
militancy may also cash in on the discriminatory nature of the
country's educational and economic systems. It is, consequently,
necessary to make an objective assessment of the political, economic
and cultural factors that enable and sustain the growth of these
forces, and effective action must be taken to rid the nation of this
menace. If the Government is not sympathetic and their funding and
communication linkages are shut down, these groups would not be able
to operate, and would certainly not be growing in strength.
Media investigations suggest that the Islamic militants in
Bangladesh are presently split into more than a dozen groups, with
each commanding a strength of a few hundred or thousand. The numbers
alone do not give an adequate picture of the seriousness of the
situation. On December 25, 2003, for instance, national newspapers
reported that nine persons - including five members of the Ansar (the
state 'Para Police') - had been arrested in connection with a bomb
explosion inside an abandoned and dilapidated residential hotel on
the western Khulna-Jessore Road. The arrested Ansar members were on
duty at the hotel premises at the time of the explosion. The blast
occurred when they were making bombs, and Police suspect that the
four young men arrested belong to an extremist Islamic organisation,
possibly the Al Muzahid party. The Police also recovered several
books and booklets authored by fundamentalist leaders from the hotel
rooms. A hand-written brochure titled Islamic Andolaner Note ('Points
for the Islamic Movement') was also recovered. Police officer
Shafiqul Islam of the Khalishpur thana (police station) disclosed,
"One could make more than 100 bombs out of the quantities of
bomb-making materials which were recovered by the police from the
hotel rooms". The recovered materials included sulphur, potash,
broken pieces of glasses, nails and rice husk. Police also recovered
12 live bombs.
While there is still not authoritative assessment of the strength
and firepower of these groups, and weapons seizures have been
negligible, while storming some 'training camps' in the jungles in
southern Cox's Bazaar, security forces found advanced weapons, as
also evidence of the involvement of the Rohingya Muslim rebels from
Myanmar's Arakan province. Various investigations over the past few
years, moreover, demonstrate that the bombs used by these extremists
were highly sophisticated.
So far, security agencies have reportedly identified 48 'training
centres' across the country. The names of an estimated 13 militant
organisations are known, but only a few of them have created news.
The known groups include Shahadat-e-al-Hikma,
Jamaat-ul-Mujahid-ul-Bangladesh, Jaamat-e-Yahia Trust, Hizbut Tawhid,
Al Harakat-ul-Islamia, Al Markaj-ul-Islami, Jamaatul Falaiya,
Tawhidi Janata, World Islamic Front, Jumaat-as-Sadat,
Shahadat-e-Nabuat, Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami and Al Khidmat.
To resolve the problem, secular thinkers suggest that the
administration must first shed its 'ostrich syndrome', take serious
note of such clandestine groups and work out strategies to
neutralise them, since they reject both democracy and the idea of
the sovereignty of the people. The so-called Islamists do not
conceal their intention to set up a theocratic state, and hold the
existing democracy responsible for 'anti-Islamisation'. Their
ideological roots lie in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and several
arrested militants have confessed that they received arms training
in Pakistan, and fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Reports have it that Prime Minister Khaleda Zia has now asked the
Home Ministry and concerned agencies to launch a 'massive manhunt'
for these clandestine extremist groups. But how can the Government
act effectively against these militants with the Jamaat-e-Islami and
Islami Oikya Jote, two self-professed Islamic fundamentalist
parties, as its coalition partners? How can the Government contain
such militancy when it's own political strength is shared by the
religious fundamentalists?
Haroon
Habib is a Senior journalist, commentator and author, Dhaka;
former Chief Editor of Bangladesh Sangbad Sanstha (BSS), the
country's premier news agency. This article appeared in SAIR. |
